Negative Brief: Taiwan Arms Cutoff – bad idea

By Coach Vance

***Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reform its foreign aid.***

AFF plan cancels US arms aid commitment to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The first problem with the plan is that the TRA arms aid commitment doesn't exist. TRA requires the US to sell Taiwan defensive materials and then, in case of war, take whatever action we find appropriate. But if we did have military aid to Taiwan, it would be a good thing and we ought to do more of it. Military aid (if we had it) and arms sales (which we do occasionally do) help Taiwan by giving them better defense against potential Chinese aggression and a stronger negotiating posture when dealing with the mainland.

Arms deals with Taiwan aren't causing any problems in the Status Quo. And none of the advantages of better relations with China will happen by cutting US arms deals with Taiwan because there are too many other issues blocking US/China relations that AFF can't solve.

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Negative: Taiwan Arms Cutoff – bad idea

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

If only there were a US military aid commitment to Taiwan!

The Negative Philosophy in today's round is that there is no US military aid commitment to Taiwan contained in the Taiwan Relations Act. But even if there were, it would be a good thing and we should help Taiwan.

TOPICALITY

1. Nothing to reform. Taiwan Relations Act has no US military aid commitment, so it cannot be reformed

A. No Affirmative evidence

We challenge the Affirmative team to quote the sentence in the Taiwan Relations Act that refers to any US military aid commitment.

B. Law professor agrees: TRA "aid" commitment doesn't exist. (and keep in mind, selling arms isn't aid)

Prof. Julian Ku 2016. (Professor of Constitutional Law at Hofstra Univ. School of Law) 15 Jan 2016 "Taiwan’s U.S. Defense Guarantee is Not Strong, But It Isn’t That Weak Either " <https://www.lawfareblog.com/taiwans-us-defense-guarantee-not-strong-it-isnt-weak-either>

With that in mind, it is worth considering whether and to what extent the U.S. has an obligation – legal or otherwise – to defend Taiwan against military action by China. Commentators, such as [Richard Bernstein writing in Foreign Policy,](http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/14/can-this-woman-move-taiwan-away-from-china/) sometimes refer to a U.S. obligation “to intervene if China launched an armed strike on Taiwan.” As a legal matter, this is both not quite right and not exactly wrong. While the U.S. does not have a strict legal obligation to defend Taiwan against an attack by China, in my view, the U.S. does not have a strict legal obligation to defend its other allies either. Here, the relevant legal document is the [Taiwan Relations Act](http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html) (TRA). The legislation was enacted by Congress in 1979 following the U.S. decision to cut ties with Taiwan, abrogate the U.S.-Republic of China (Taiwan) Mutual Defense Treaty, and establish relations with China. The TRA is frequently cited by U.S. policymakers as the legal framework governing Taiwan policy actions. In reality, although the TRA has practical importance for civil and commercial relations with Taiwan, it does not strictly bind U.S. policymakers with respect to US-China-Taiwan relations. TRA Sections 2 and 3 contain the key provisions with respect to military defense of Taiwan. Section 2 declares as a matter of U.S. policy that the U.S. expects the “future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means,” that “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, [is] a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area”, and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” Section 3 implements this policy by requiring that the U.S. government “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” It further requires the President “to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.” Finally, the TRA requires the “President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.” On its face, the TRA appears to only require the U.S. to sell defensive materials to allow Taiwan to maintain self-defense and for the President to inform Congress of any threat to the security of Taiwan. If China launched a military assault, the President is only legally obligated to “determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action.” This requirement is for executive-legislative consultations and hardly seems like an obligation, as Bernstein alleges, “to intervene if China launched an armed strike on Taiwan.”

2. Trade, not aid

A. "Aid" would be giving them stuff for free. Selling arms to Taiwan isn't aid, it's trade. The definition of TRADE:

Merriam-Webster online Dictionary 2018. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trade>

1a(1) **:** the business of buying and selling or bartering commodities **:** [commerce](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commerce)

B. Violation: Plan claims benefits from cutting off arms "trade" with Taiwan

It's all through their evidence.

C. Impact: Extra topical claims and benefits must be dropped from the round

Affirmative can only claim benefits from any evidence that talks about what would happen if we do a topical policy change: stop "AID" to Taiwan. Since we're not aiding Taiwan, that evidence will be hard to find, but that's all they are allowed to introduce into this round. If there is no evidence of benefits to cutting "AID" (NOT TRADE), then there is no benefit to the AFF plan and a NEG ballot is justified.

INHERENCY

1. Arms for Taiwan already curtailed to improve relations with China

The age of big US arms sales to Taiwan is over because the US is trying not to antagonize China

**We challenge the Affirmative to name any arms transfers from the US to Taiwan since 2014 when this evidence was written. If they can't name any, it proves the author was right!**

J. Michael Cole 2014 (senior non-resident fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, and an Associate researcher at the French Center for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC) in Taipei ) 22 Oct 2014 From Gunboats to Nuts and Bolts <http://thinking-taiwan.com/from-gunboats-to-nuts-and-bolts/>

Despite the recent [optimism](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/10/07/2003601473) expressed by some of the participants at the 13th annual U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference held earlier this month in Williamsburg, Virginia, the days when the U.S. sold billion dollars of military platforms to Taiwan are probably over. It has been more than three years since the U.S. released a major arms package for the island, the [longest period](http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf) since the early 1990s. Barring a radical shift in Washington, we can expect that the U.S. government will maintain its current strategy of seeking to avoid angering Beijing with major sales of military equipment to Taiwan — and this despite a hardening stance in the U.S. vis-à-vis a China that, after years of cajoling, has become increasingly belligerent.

SIGNIFICANCE / HARMS

1. US Arms for Taiwan don't cause tensions

Not a significant problem: US arms sales to Taiwan are a manageable irritant to China

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

Private Chinese reaction to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has generally been more textured and nuanced than public reaction. Privately, Chinese experts recognize that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are mandated by U.S. law and that they are not going to stop anytime soon. These experts understand, though do not generally agree with, U.S. reasoning for the sales, but acknowledge that change will take time. They also wonder aloud whether U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are driven mostly by the commercial interests of defense contractors. But within broad parameters, they see U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as a manageable irritant in China’s relationship with the United States and they don’t get as vexed about the issue as the Chinese government does at the official level.

Current policy on Taiwan has been successful at maintaining peace and allowing US-China relations to grow

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fello; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

The architecture’s ambiguity contributes directly to its staying power and fairly consistent application over more than three decades – a second major strength. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the policy, whether one likes or dislikes it, the fact is, U.S. policy on Taiwan – as governed by the three-pronged policy architecture discussed above – has been remarkably consistent over five presidencies (Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Jr. and Obama) and across partisan lines in both the White House and in Congress. This staying power and consistency, coupled with the consistency of China’s doctrine and policies, has at least resulted in broad predictability surrounding cross-Strait military and security issues. Perhaps the most significant success of this architecture is that, whatever its weaknesses (to be discussed below), it has created a context within which Taiwan itself, China-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations have been able to develop and blossom despite profound differences between the sides over several major issues.

US arms sales are not the cause of the problem, they're a symptom. Real problem is China/Taiwan mistrust

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

Third, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which China construes as a major contributor to – if not the primary source of – cross-Strait tensions, are not, in fact, the core problem in the cross-Strait equation, but rather, a derivative symptom of the much deeper problems described above. It seems clear to me that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue precisely as long as the core issues remain unresolved. And thus, though the United States is clearly a stakeholder in cross-Strait issues, it is not the primary mover on them; China and Taiwan are. Similarly, strategic mistrust between China and the United States is not the primary impediment to resolution of the Taiwan issue; strategic mistrust between China and Taiwan is.

Arms sales aren’t causing China/Taiwan tensions, and they should continue until the tensions are resolved

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

I understand why China objects to these sales as a matter of principle, but I believe that China does not fully appreciate or “own” the impact of its own actions on Taiwan threat perceptions and Taiwan and U.S. decision-making. Most fundamentally, unless and until the underlying issues in the China/Taiwan dispute are resolved, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will continue. Arms sales, while a significant factor in the cross-Strait military and security picture, are a symptom of the enduring tensions, not the root cause. It is within China’s and Taiwan’s power to generate a cross-Strait context in which lower levels of arms sales are viewed by Taiwan as necessary, but we are not there yet, and until we get there, continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan make sense for the United States.

US arms sales aren’t hurting China/Taiwan relationship

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

The third piece of the puzzle is the Taiwan-China relationship – how have U.S. arms sales to Taiwan affected the cross-Strait dynamic? The answer to this question depends on which aspect of the relationship one is looking at. In terms of economic, trade and cultural relations, it seems abundantly clear that U.S. arms sales have, in any case, not impeded the robust and dramatic development of cross-Strait ties. I think it would be hard to make the case that there is causality between the arms sales and the development of cross-Strait relations, because one would have to control for many other factors in the equation, but it would be hard to contest the fact that cross-Strait ties have blossomed even as the United States has sold arms to Taiwan.

SOLVENCY

1. Taiwan policy won't improve US/China relations

Conceding to China on Taiwan won’t help us on other issues

Richard C. Bush 2013 (senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of its Center on Northeast Asian Policy Studies ) Jan 2013 “Uncharted Strait” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

The second group misunderstands the benefits and costs of a significant American accommodation to China regarding Taiwan (e.g. by sharply cutting back arms sales). In fact, Washington has frictions with China on a growing list of issues. Conceding to Beijing on Taiwan will not help us elsewhere.

Removing the Taiwan issue would not reduce US/China conflict – too many other issues remain

Richard C. Bush 2013 (senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and director of its Center on Northeast Asian Policy Studies ) Jan 2013 “Uncharted Strait” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

Although Taiwan has at times been the most important source of U.S.-China conflict, it is not the only one. For example, Beijing’s goals in East Asia are not limited to bringing the island back into the PRC fold. In addition, it seeks to expand its security perimeter away from its eastern and southern coast, where it was for decades. That in turn has meant that the PLA navy and air force are operating increasingly in the traditional domain of U.S. and Japanese forces. Removing Taiwan as a problem would in no way end or reduce this mutual impingement; it would only change its location. Taiwan aside, Beijing would still regard American “socialization” as negative.

2. Won't help China/N.Korea negotiations #1: China can't do much more about N. Korea

AFF believes backing away from Taiwan will help motivate China to influence North Korea toward de-nuclearization. But that won't happen…

China doesn't hold the key to resolving N. Korea issues

Eleanor Albert 2018 (Council on Foreign Relations) 28 March 2018 "The China–North Korea Relationship" <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship>

Even as China signals that it will toughen its stance toward North Korea—though stopping short of challenging its survivability—there is mounting skepticism that China alone can resolve the North Korea problem. Chinese officials have emphasized that they do not “[hold the key](https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/05/08/china-done-utmost-north-korea-editorials-debates/101437338/) to the issue.” Some analysts say that China’s tightening of economic ties are [unlikely to deter](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/world/asia/china-north-korea-nuclear-problem.html?mcubz=0&_r=0) Kim’s nuclear ambitions, while others say the North Korean leader [no longer cares](http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/18/north-korea-the-full-transcript-215615) what China thinks of its actions.

China's influence over N. Korea is exaggerated and increasing pressure leads to massive refugees into China, which they don't want


Associated Press 2017. "CHINA: Don't hold us responsible for solving North Korea" 11 July 2017 <https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-dont-hold-us-responsible-for-solving-n-korea-china-says-2017-7>

China is North Korea's only major diplomatic ally and economic partner, and the U.S. and others have called on Beijing to use whatever leverage it has to pressure North Korea into curbing nuclear tests and missile launches that violate U.N. sanctions. However, China says perceptions of its influence with North Korea are exaggerated. It also refuses to take measures that might destabilize North Korea's hard-line communist regime and lead to violence, massive flows of refugees into China, and the possibility of a united Korea allied with the United States.

3. Won't help China/N. Korea negotiations #2: Bad relations with Trump block any hope of success

China won't help U.S. put pressure on N. Korea because of Trump's trade war (AFF can't solve trade war)

Shannon Vavra 2018 (journalist) 7 Apr 2018 Trump's trade war changes China's calculus on North Korea <https://www.axios.com/north-korea-china-trump-trade-war-kim-jong-un-0508da35-6cd0-41b1-bf6e-60d55b780941.html>



China will probably never do more about pressuring N. Korea because they don't trust Trump

Evan Osnos 2017. (journalist) Why China Won’t Pressure North Korea as Much as Trump Wants, THE NEW YORKER 19 Sept 2017 <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-china-isnt-ready-to-put-pressure-on-north-korea>

At the center of the North Korean nuclear crisis is a pivotal question: How much is China *really* willing to pressure and punish its longtime ally in Pyongyang? Recent conversations in Beijing and Washington suggest that Chinese leaders have decided to increase pressure substantially but are not—and probably never will be—willing to help President Trump strangle North Korea into submission. China doesn’t trust Kim Jong Un—but it trusts Trump even less.

4. No trade benefit with China #1: Trade with China is bad for the U.S.

AFF claims their plan will increase US/China trade. That probably won't happen (see Solvency #5) but even if it does, that would not be a good thing.

Turn: Increased trade with China has cost millions of US jobs due to unfair trade practices

Ed Gerwin 2018 (senior fellow for trade and global opportunity at the Progressive Policy Institute) "Confronting China's Threat to Open Trade" June 2018 <https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/PPI_China_2018.pdf>

In the first decade of China’s WTO membership, China’s U.S.-bound exports of lower-tech goods like furniture and textiles – aided by unfair practices like dumping and currency manipulation – caused serious and concentrated economic dislocations, especially for lower-skilled U.S. workers and their communities. Although there’s robust debate about the causes and extent of this “China Shock,” its impact was undeniably significant, costing (by some estimates) up to 2.4 million U.S. jobs, and undermining support for open trade.

Trade with China harms US technological development through theft of intellectual property

David Adler 2017 (economics researcher; advisor for XA Investments LLC) "Countering Chinese Mercantilism" 10 Aug 2017 CITY JOURNAL <https://www.city-journal.org/html/countering-chinese-mercantilism-15391.html>

At the moment, Chinese devaluation practices are in a lull, and the Beijing leadership recently intervened to support the national currency. But China is pursuing other mercantilist practices related to technology transfer, whereby firms seeking entry to Chinese markets are forced to share their intellectual capital with local companies under licensing agreements. This arrangement frequently results in Chinese “re-innovation” of the existing technology. The United States will need to counter these moves, lest it lose its competitive advantage in advanced research and development.

5. No trade benefit with China #2: Trump's trade war blocks improvement (outside the scope of AFF plan)

Link: Trump is escalating a trade war with tariffs on Chinese goods, and China is retaliating

WALL STREET JOURNAL 2018 (journalists Jacob Schlesinger, Linling Wei and Bob Davis) 16 Sept 2018 "U.S. and China Ramp Up Trade Threats" <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-weighs-skipping-trade-talks-after-u-s-tariff-threat-1537115334>

After negotiations between Mr. Liu, Mr. Mnuchin, and other members of the Trump team failed to resolve differences, Mr. Trump imposed 25% tariffs on $50 billion in Chinese goods earlier this summer. China retaliated by imposing tariffs on the same amount of U.S. goods. Mr. Trump responded by threatening to impose tariffs on $200 billion in additional Chinese goods. In July, the administration unveiled a 195-page list of products it was considering for those tariffs—from fish to luggage to semiconductor equipment—and held more than a week of public hearings in late August, listening to pleas from importers and others asking to be spared.

Solvency Impact: Can't improve trade with China --They won't negotiate because of Trump's issues

WALL STREET JOURNAL 2018. (journalist Linling Wei) 22 Sept 2018 "China Cancels Trade Talks wiith U.S. Amid Escalation in Tariff Threats" <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-cancels-trade-talks-with-u-s-amid-escalation-of-tariff-threats-1537581226?mod=cx_picks&cx_navSource=cx_picks&cx_tag=collabctx&cx_artPos=1#cxrecs_s>

China scotched trade talks with the U.S. that were planned for the coming days, according to people briefed on the matter, further dimming prospects for resolving a trade battle between the world’s two largest economies. The decision to pull out of the talks follows the latest escalation in trade tensions.

DISADVANTAGES

1. China takes over Taiwan

Link: US arms sales are key to Taiwan being able to hold on long enough for US military intervention to come to the rescue – or to deter an attack in the first place

Richard C. Bush 2014 (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china)) 14 Jan 2014 Thoughts on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2014/01/14-us-arms-sales-taiwan-bush>

My fifth and final point has to do with the political character of arms sales versus their military value. Of course, the U.S. transfer of advance weapons systems to Taiwan has a political character for both Beijing and Taipei. That is particularly true of civilian leaders in both places, who happen to be the folks that most of us talk to. But U.S. weaponry is not trivial in a military sense. From the U.S. perspective, its arms sales, whatever their political value for Taiwan, should also contribute to Taiwan’s ability to deter a Mainland attack or threat of attack. If we were to decide to come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of such an attack, we would need Taiwan to hold on for several weeks while we do all that would be needed to mount that defense. So Taiwan needs the capability to hold on. Optimally, if it possesses that capability then Beijing is less likely to consider an attack in the first place. In this regard, there is growing concern that Taiwan’s past defense strategy, on which its arms requests to the United States are based, is no longer appropriate to its threat environment, thus reducing the deterrent effect of the capabilities it has or might have.

Link: Taiwan not getting US support leads to China planning to take over Taiwan

Dave Majumdar 2018 (defense editor of the National Interest) THE NATIONAL INTEREST "China Can't Launch a Full-Scale Military Invasion of Taiwan (Yet)" 23 July 2018 (parentheses in original) <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-cant-launch-full-scale-military-invasion-taiwan-yet-26621>

“(If) the Chinese see the vulnerability of Taiwan, not getting US support, then they would be thinking about starting scenarios where they would be able to take Taiwan over," Taiwanese foreign Wu’s statement comes on the heels of a Chinese live-fire drill in the Taiwan Straits, which is prompting Taipei to seek reassurances from its few allies—including the United States.

Brink: Pentagon analysis says China is considering and preparing for an invasion of Taiwan right now

Radio Free Asia 2018 (private, non-profit broadcasting corporation funded by grants from the US government) 17 Aug 2018 China 'Preparing Military Capability' to Invade Taiwan: US Report <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/taiwan-military-08172018130627.html>

China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is gradually preparing for a possible invasion of the neighboring democratic island of Taiwan, according to a military analysis published by the Pentagon in Washington. Armed forces under the ruling Chinese Communist Party "continued to develop and deploy increasingly advanced military capabilities intended to coerce Taiwan, signal Chinese resolve, and gradually improve capabilities for an invasion," the U.S. Department of Defense said in an annual report on China's military capabilities. "These improvements pose major challenges to Taiwan’s security."

Impact: Not worth the risk to get “better relations” because the impact is U.S. strategic disaster. Arms sales are key to prevent that from happening

Prof. Shyu-tu Lee 2011. (President of the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association) “Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

To prevent a crisis from escalating to nuclear war, Glaser says that the United States should back away from its commitment to Taiwan. Such accommodation, he argues, would smooth the way for better relations with China in the decades to come. Yet if Taiwan were to fall, the United States would suffer a geostrategic disaster. The sea-lanes and airspace around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China could turn Japan and South Korea into vassal states. With the demise of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, the United States would be forced to retreat to Hawaii. To avoid that fate, Washington must reiterate that the future of Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwanese people. It must deploy sufficient naval and air forces in the western Pacific to deter Chinese aggression, initiate high-level military exchanges with Taiwan to facilitate joint military planning, and speed up the sale to Taiwan of F-16 fighters and other weapons that would be useful in resisting a Chinese invasion.

A/T “China doesn’t have the capability to invade Taiwan” –They soon will.

Prof. Charles L. Glaser 2015. (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ ) A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 2015 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/isec_a_00199.pdf>

China’s improved military capabilities may increase its willingness both to start and to escalate a Taiwan crisis. Fifteen years ago, China had little capability to invade or blockade Taiwan. Today it can begin to imagine successfully invading Taiwan, and its capability will only increase with time.

2. Chinese Aggression Beyond Taiwan

Link: Taiwan’s request for arms sales comes from response to Chinese aggression

*Douglas Paal 2011 (Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ) “Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS* <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

Despite a gradual easing of tensions between China and Taiwan, Beijing continues to enhance its military capabilities with regard to Taipei. This has developed a vicious cycle. By choosing to increase the military offensive capability deployed opposite Taiwan, Beijing compels Taiwan's leadership to seek outside sources of support and arms to deter Chinese aggression. If Taiwan's leaders failed to find that support, their voters would remove them.

Link & Brink: Taiwan is key to blocking Chinese aggression on other issues

Richard C. Bush III 2013. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2013 Uncharted Strait <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

Should the United States concede to China on Taiwan, the lessons that Beijing would learn about the intentions of the United States would likely discourage its moderation and accommodation on other issues like Korea or maritime East Asia; in that respect, America’s friends and allies are right. Continuity of U.S. policy toward Taiwan will not guarantee that China’s actions in other areas will support the status quo, but it increases the likelihood that it will. Conversely, a China that addresses its Taiwan problem with creativity and due regard to the views on the island says something positive about what kind of great power the PRC will be. A more aggressive approach, one that relies on pressure and intimidation, signals reason for concern about its broader intentions. In this regard, Taiwan is the canary in the East Asian coal mine.

Link & Brink: Any dramatic decrease in arms sales would be destabilizing and harmful to US interests

David J. Firestein 2014 (EastWest Institute, Vice President and Perot Fellow; 18 years worked as a US diplomat) Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 5 June 2014 “China’s Relations with Taiwan and North Korea” <http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Firestein-USCC%20Testimony%20%28FINAL%29.pdf>

I regard U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as stabilizing and as a force for good for Taiwan and for cross-Strait relations, at least when viewed from a U.S. (and Taiwan) perspective. I believe they should continue indefinitely at a robust level in the general range of recent years’ sales; any dramatic decrease in arms sales to Taiwan under current circumstances would, I think, be destabilizing and harmful to the interests of the United States.

Link: They wouldn’t stop with Taiwan. China has motives to continue aggression even if/when/after they take Taiwan

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker & Bonnie Glaser 2011 (Tucker is Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Glaser is a Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and also a Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum) Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? WASHINGTON QUARTERLY <http://csis.org/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf>

Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest, spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance to internal unhappiness. Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which, though fostered by the government, is still difficult to control. Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten regime stability. Accordingly, a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing need for Beijing to demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that need.

Impact: Risk of nuclear attack. Caving in to China increases risk of nuclear attack on the US homeland

Prof. Shyu-tu Lee 2011. (President of the North American Taiwanese Professors’ Association) “Disengaging from Taiwan” July/Aug 2011 FOREIGN AFFAIRS <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2011-07-01/disengaging-taiwan>

But by ignoring China's history and economic policy and other relevant factors, Glaser arrives at policy prescriptions that would increase the chance of a Chinese nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland. Glaser misjudges Chinese motives. China's military modernization is not primarily motivated by insecurity, as he asserts. China is not threatened by the United States or any of its neighbors. It is advocating its model of governance -- managed capitalism combined with one-party authoritarianism -- as a more efficient alternative to a free-market economy and democracy. China's mission is to regain its place as the dominant superpower so that the country can cleanse itself of the humiliation it has experienced at the hands of the West.

3. Weakens US alliances in East Asia

Link: Giving China what they want on Taiwan arms would make Japan and S. Korea doubt their alliance with the US

Richard C. Bush III 2013. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2013 Uncharted Strait <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/01/14-taiwan-bush>

The second group misunderstands the benefits and costs of a significant American accommodation to China regarding Taiwan (e.g. by sharply cutting back arms sales). In fact, Washington has frictions with China on a growing list of issues. Conceding to Beijing on Taiwan will not help us elsewhere. Moreover, our friends and allies (e.g. Japan and Korea) will worry that the United States might sacrifice their interests next for the sake of good relations with China.

Link: Japan and S. Korea would believe that if we abandon Taiwan, we would abandon them

Richard C. Bush III 2013. (Director, [Center for East Asia Policy Studies](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/east-asia-policy-studies) and Senior Fellow, [Foreign Policy](http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy), [John L. Thornton China Center](http://www.brookings.edu/about/centers/china), Brookings Institution) 14 Jan 2013 Uncharted Strait <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/1/14-taiwan-bush/14-taiwan-bush.pdf>

U.S. allies and partners—Japan, the Republic Korea, and others not necessarily in the Asian region—have have much at stake in Washington’s future approach to Taiwan. Simply put, a United States that would abandon Taiwan could abandon them. Of course, there may be hypothetical reasons why America might withdraw support that stem from Taiwan’s policies rather than its own commitment. So the reasons for any abandonment would be important. But the fear remains.


Impact: Strong US/Japan alliance is key to democracy & prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region

Ian Easton, Randall Schriver, and Sabrina Tsai 2014. (Easton – master’s degree in China studies; research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, a Virginia-based think tank where he conducts research on defense and security issues involving the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan. Schriver - founding partners of Armitage International LLC, a consulting firm that specializes in international business development and strategies; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Tsai - research associate at the Project 2049 Institute, where she conducts research and monitors U. S. foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region) THE ALLIANCE - TOWARD A STRONGER U.S.-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP 18 July 2014 <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwijn8uy89TdAhUFy1MKHfkVAhIQFjABegQIARAC&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.spf.org%2Fmedia%2Fupload%2F2_Project2049.pdf&usg=AOvVaw22TXd1Mw9XrrkQBS7mEIXH>

The most important aspect of Japan’s national security strategy is its defensive alliance with the United States. Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S. security commitment to Japan has served as an anchor stabilizing the region and enabling growth. The stunning political and economic transformation of post-war Japan created the world’s second most prosperous country after the United States and a model for other aspiring regional powers to follow. Arguably, democracy and prosperity would not have flourished in South Korea and Taiwan in the absence of the U.S.-Japan alliance; Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong would not enjoy their current standards of living; and China would not be an emerging great power. In ways large and small the U.S.-Japan alliance has served as a pillar supporting the dramatic rise of the Asia-Pacific on the world stage.

Impact: Strong US/S.Korea alliance is key to regional and global security and deterring war with North Korea

Charles L. Pritchard, John H. Tilelli Jr. and Scott A. Snyder 2010 (chairs of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force #64. Pritchard – masters degree in International Studies; formerUS ambassador and special negotiator with North Korea. Tilelli - retired US Army general, former commander of US forces in S. Korea. Snyder- senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations) US POLICY TOWARD THE KOREAN PENINSULA, <https://books.google.com/books?id=rLA3eU8_9nwC&pg=PT40&dq=u.s.+alliance+%22south+korea%22+%22peninsular+stability%22&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiZ9Yfh9NTdAhWS71MKHbdIBHYQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=u.s.%20alliance%20%22south%20korea%22%20%22peninsular%20stability%22&f=false>



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